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ABSTRACT
With the publication of two statements on accounting for derivatives (SFAS 133 and SFAS
138), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has taken another substantial step on the
path toward its goal of requiring the reporting of allfinancial instruments at market value, generally
with unrealized gains and losses included in income. This study investigates whether reporting an
unrealized gain or loss in a separate line item on the income statement, as opposed to disclosure
only in a footnote, affects how financial analysts use and evaluate information on such gains and
losses. The vehicle for this research is unrealized gains or losses on derivatives. The study consisted
of short financial analysis cases, presented tofinancial analysts and executives primarily through
mail surveys. Each subject received one of the four different possible combinations of derivative
gain or loss and disclosure type. When the unrealized derivative gain/loss was included as a
separate line item in the income statement, analysts included the gain/loss sigr;ificantly more often
in their PIE ratios, and were more likely to list the derivative as afactor affecting their investment
recommendation, than when the derivative gain/loss was disclosed only in a footnote. Moreover,
regardless of disclosure type, analysts included unrealized losses on derivatives in their PIE ratios
significantly more often than unrealized gains, and were more likely to list the derivative as afactor
affecting their investment recommendation when there was a loss as opposed to a gain. Perhaps
more interesting, given the FASB 'sdisclosure rules in Statement 133 (FASB, 1998), was thefact that
when the gain/loss was presented as a separate line item in the income statement a substantial
minority of analysts (44 percent) chose to exclude the gains from their PIE ratios, whereas only i7
percent chose to exclude losses. Finally, results from a subset of participants who were asked to
think aloud while analyzing the case suggest that analysts are less likely to consider information
regarding derivatives when it is contained only in afootnote. in addition, the protocols suggest that
if participants acquire the information on derivatives, they may give as' much as, if not more
consideration to that information, and evaluate it more negatively, when it is disclosed in afootnote
rather than on the income statement.
This study contributes to knowledge in the area of financial statement disclosure in two
primary ways. First, it provides evidence with respect to disclosure alternatives for unrealized
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studies regarding disclosure issues, and indicates that disclosure format may affect analysts' use
of information, contrary to a strict interpretation of the efficient markets hypothesis. Second, it
suggests that a substantial minority of analysts seem toprefer to exclude unrealized derivative gains
and losses, particularly gains, when evaluating earnings for analysis, especially if the amount of
those gains and losses is clearly disclosed and readily available. This further supports the need for
full disclosure of unrealized derivative gains and losses included in income.
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates whether reporting unrealized losses or gains on financial instruments
as a separate line item in the income statement, as opposed to disclosure only in a footnote, affects
financip.l analysts' use and evaluation of information about those gains and losses. We use
information on derivatives as the specific vehicle for this investigation. Until implementation of
SFAS 133 after June, 2000 (FASB, 1998), in order to fmd detailed information on a company's
investments in derivatives, investors have had to 'sort through voluminous notes to the financial
statements (Roulstone, 1999). Although the new Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
standard on derivatives is intended to give investors more readily available information on the value
of derivatives held by companies and improve the quality of financial reporting, implementation of
the complex new standard on derivatives may be costly and difficult (Reinstein & Lander, 2000;
FASB, 1999a; MacDonald, 1997), overly complicated (Wilson, 1998), and could lead to increased
volatility in companies' reported earnings and equity (Lesak, 1998). Moreover, it seems likely that
where unrealized gains and losses on derivatives are included in income (the general model under
Statement 133) they will not generally be shown as a separate line item, but rather lumped in with
other miscellaneous non-operating income items under an "other" category. Also, the FASB
specifically eliminated any requirements to separately disclose gross gains and losses on derivatives,
in some cases substituting requirements for disclosure of net gains or losses. The FASB justified
these decisions because they "could reduce the cost of applying the Statement without a significant
reduction in the benefits to users" (FASB, 1998, paragraph 506).
As the FASB continues with its project on reporting financial instruments at fair value, and
as researchers continue to raise questions about market efficiency (see, e.g., Kothari, 2001; Lee,
2001) further study is needed to investigate to what extent, if any, disclosure format affects the use
of information about fair value of financial instruments. If, consistent with the efficient markets
hypothesis, disclosure format does not affect the use of information about financial instruments, then
incurring the costs associated with implementing standards for fair value measurement may not be
warranted. If disclosure format does matter, then assumptions about costs and benefits may need to
be reassessed. This has implications beyond the United Stat;~ because harmonized international
accounting standards are gaining in importance with the enormous increase in global investing and
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3lending (Pacter, 1998). International Accounting Standards Committee (lASe) Standards 32 and 39
(lASC, 1998a; 1998b), for instance, include requirements for accounting and reporting for
derivatives that closely resemble those in SFAS No. 133 (FASB, 1999b). In addition, both the FASB
and IASC are working toward reporting fair-value recognition of all financial instruments in the
financial statements (FASB, 2001; JWG, 2000).
This study also investigates whether analysts will be more likely to include unrealized losses
on derivatives in their PIE ratios as opposed to unrealized gains. Research in psychology, finance,
and accounting, including recent research by Koonce et al. (2001), suggests that investors place
more weight on loss probabilities and outcomes than they do on gain probabilities and outcomes.
Therefore, analysts may be more likely to include unrealized losses on derivatives in their PIE ratios
than to include unrealized gains. The FASB has, by substituting reporting of net gains and losses for
reporting of gross gains and losses, deprived analysts of the information needed to exercise this
tendency toward conservatism in interpretation of at least some fmancial information. While the
F,4\SB has expressed its own rejection of conservatism as an objective for fmancial reporting, it is
not clear that they benefit users by imposing equal treatment for unrealized financial instrument
gains and losses by allowing net reporting. Moreover, Koonce et al. (2001) indicate that financial
statement users view derivatives as riskier than other financial items even when the underlying
exposure is held constant, so even unrealized gains on derivatives may be viewed by analysts as
risky. Therefore, research on the fmancial reporting of unrealized gains and losses on derivatives
is important and needed.
To investigate these issues, we asked 81 financial analysts to review the financial statements
and footnotes of a hypothetical company and to calculate PIE ratios for three years. Of the 81, 17
analysts completed the task in the presence of one of the authors and were asked to think out loud
while performing the task. The hypothetical company had either an unrealized gain or an unrealized
loss on derivatives in the third year, which was either recognized as a separate line item in the
income statement or disclosed only in a footnote.
The results of this study suggest that, contrary to a strict interpretation of the efficient
markets hypothesis, the use of derivatives information in the decision-making of relatively
sophisticated financial statement users is affected by whether information is reported as a line item
in the income statement or disclosed only in a footnote. These findings are consistent with inferences
drawn from prior research and extend those prior findings to the topic of reporting for derivatives.
In addition, the results of this study suggest that analysts weigh losses on derivatives more heavily
than gains on derivatives. Although most analysts included losses on derivatives in their PIE ratios
when losses were clearly displayed on the income statement, and a few even included them when
they were only disclosed in a footnote, many analysts removed gains on derivatives when such
information was shown on the income statement and none included gains when they were only
disclosed in a footnote.
Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, Volume 8, Number 1,2004
4In addition, results from a group of analysts who were asked to think aloud while analyzing
the case suggest that analysts are less likely to acquire information regarding derivatives when it is
contained only in a footnote. The verbal protocols also suggest that, among those who acquired the
derivatives information, analysts may have been more concerned about derivatives when the
information was disclosed in a footnote instead of being clearly displayed on the income statement.
These fmdings extend previous research on financial statement recognition versus disclosure of
information by providing direct evidence about whether information disclosed in a footnote is: a)
not acquired by financial statement users or b) acquired but given less weight than information
shown in the financial statements. The findings of this study suggest that derivatives information
disclosed in a footnote is less likely to be acquired by financial statement users, but if acquired it
may be given equal or more weight than information disclosed in fmancial statements.
This study provides support for the value of including information as a separate line item on
the face of the fmancial statements when it is thought to be important to financial statement users.
Currently, companies are still allowed to include derivative amounts in "other" on the balance sheet
and income statement. The results of this study suggest that ifthe objective is to make information
readily available and clear, a separate fmancial statement line item may be needed. As a result of
the adoption of net gain or loss reporting, even investors who are willing and able to sort through
footnotes for more detailed information may not find quantitative data that they would want to use
in their decisions if it were available. The disclosure decisions adopted by the FASB in the interest
of cost reduction and reduction of disclosure of proprietary information may not prove as low-cost
to many users as the Board supposed, in that they may deprive users of information that might well
affect their investment decisions.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
A derivative is a financial instrument that derives its value from an "underlying" such as an
"interest rate, security price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices or rates, or
other variable" (FASB, 1998, paragraphs 6 & 7). Derivatives are used as speculative investments,
as well as to hedge against risk. Currently, about seventy-five percent of corporations and almost
all fmancial institutions use derivatives (Lesak, 1998). Derivatives can be very complex and are
potentially volatile investments that may result in gains or losses much greater than the amount of
initial investment, which typically is very small. Even companies that carefully developed strategies
for using derivatives as hedges (e.g., Procter & Gamble) have experienced disastrous results
(Stanko, 1996). In some cases corporate (e.g., Showa Shell Sekiyu) and government (e.g., Orange
County) losses from derivatives have exceeded $1 billion.
Recent research suggests that companies typically do not provide enough detail regarding
their quantitative disclosures about derivatives (SEC, 1998). Roulstone (1999), for example, found
that many companies included gains and losses related to derivatives in "other revenues" so that it
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Roulstone studied indicated the exact amount of actual derivatives losses incurred during the year.
In addition, the majority of companies studied also favored more complex disclosure formats that
do not indicate the underlying positions in derivatives over a simpler, more revealing tabular format.
Although Roulstone' s study predated implementation of SFAS 133, Statement 133 does not expand
the amount of quantitative information required for derivatives, nor does it specify formats.
In response to: 1) several highly publicized situations in which investors and creditors were
surprised by large unexpected losses on derivatives, 2) the fact that many companies reported
derivatives at historical cost or failed to report them at all, and 3) differing treatment of different
types of derivatives, the FASB issued SFAS Nos. 133 (FASB, 1998) and 138 (FASB, 2000).
Statement 133 is effective for all fiscal quarters of all fiscal years beginning after June 15,2000
(FASB, 1999a). SFAS No. 133 is intended to provide a consistent set of rules for accounting for
derivatives that would allow investors and creditors access to information needed to properly assess
the effects of a company's use of derivatives. It requires companies to recognize all derivatives as
either assets or liabilities in the balance sheet and to measure derivative instruments at fair value.
Accounting for changes in the fair value of a derivative (i.e., gains or losses) depends on its intended
use and resulting designation. In general, for a derivative designated as a fair value hedge (i.e.,
intended to hedge against exposure to changes in the fair value of an asset or liability), the gains or
losses on the derivative, whether realized or not, are recognized in earnings. Offsetting value
changes in the hedged items are also recognized in earnings. In addition, realized and unrealized
gains and losses on derivatives not designated as hedging instruments are recognized in earnings.
Gains and losses on derivatives designated as cash flow hedges are deferred by being recognized
as other comprehensive income until the hedged item affects income. Ineffective portions of cash
flow hedges are included in income. Similarly, gains and losses on derivatives designated as foreign
currency hedges are included in other comprehensive income to the extent the instrument is an
effective hedge. (See Wilson, 1998 and Gastineau et al., 2001) for detailed examples of the various
types of hedges addressed by SFAS No. 133 and the characteristics that qualify a financial
instrument as a derivative).
Research in psychology suggests that the information presentation format (IPF) will
influence the way information is used and evaluated to make judgments and decisions (Painton &
Gentry, 1985; Klienmuntz & Schkade, 1993). IPF is the manner, style or arrangement used to
display information (Russo, 1977). For example, Johnson, Payne and Bettman (1988) suggest that
individuals may change their strategies to search for information to fit the form ofthe information
display. In addition, the performance of the individuals in their study improved when information
was presented in decimal format rather than fractions that were difficult to process (e.g., 0.83 vs.
535/642). These findings suggest that information displays should be designed to make it easier for
decision makers to employ strategies that will result in better decisions. Similarly, Russo (1977)
found that when price information was displayed in a per unirformat on an organized list, consumer
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individuals to use information it must be both readily available and easily processed.
The IPF of financial statements may influence the information processing of fmancial
statement users in a similar way. Maines and McDaniel (2000), for example, suggest that financial
statement presentation format influences how nonprofessional investors weight comprehensive-
income information when making judgments regarding management effectiveness. Specifically,
Maines and McDaniel found that M.RA. students place significant weight on their volatility
assessments of unrealized gains when unrealized gains were shown in SFAS No. 130's statement
of comprehensive income, but not when gains were shown in the statement of stockholders' equity
under either SFAS No. 130 or SFAS 115. A related study by Hirst and Hopkins (1998) found that
analysts are more likely to use information on unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities
when that information is displayed in the statement of comprehensive income as opposed to the
statement of stockholders' equity. In addition, Hopkins (1996) found that placing a financial
instrument in the liabilities section versus the equity section of the balance sheet affected the impact
of the financial instrument on analysts' stock valuations.
An important issue related to fmancial statement presentation format is whether information
is placed in the financial statements or footnotes. Accounting standards require that certain
information must be recognized on the face of the financial statements (e.g., as a line item in the
income statement) while other information may be disclosed in footnotes. Bernard and Schipper
(1994) theorize that financial statement users may "process footnote data incompletely" or view
information disclosed in footnotes as less reliable than information recognized in the body of
financial statements. In a lease accounting context, Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1995) investigated the
issue of footnote disclosure versus financial-statement display. They found that capital markets react
to obligations contained in the balance sheet, but respond in a naive manner to footnote diselosure.
Based on these results, Imhoff et al. (1995) suggest that the form of disclosures and their ease of use
may be important, even for sophisticated analysts. Similarly, Davis-Friday et al. (1998) found that
the liability for post-retirement benefits other than pensions (PRBs) are capitalized at a higher rate
by the stock market when the PRB liability is recognized in the financial statements as opposed to
in a footnote. They posit that the market may treat information disclosed in footnotes as less reliable
than similar information recognized in the financial statements. Amir (1993) also suggests that
investors underestimated the effect of PRB liabilities on firm value when PRB information was
disclosed in footnotes.
Most of the previous research in accounting related to financial statement recognition versus
footnote disclosure has been in the capital markets area. Therefore, researchers have had to infer the
effect of recognition versus disclosure on a diverse group of market participants using aggregate
financial data. A limitation of this literature is that it provides little information about the reaction
of individual investors, or their information processing (Wahlen et aI., 2000). For example, it is
unknown whether financial statement users: a) fail to acquire information in footnotes, or b) acquire
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However, there have been a few experimental studies that have examined this issue as well. An
advantage of experimental research is that it can isolate the effects of variables on a specific group
of financial statement users (McDaniel & Hand, 1996). To date, the evidence from these studies has
been somewhat mixed.
Abdel-khalik, Thompson and Taylor (1981) found that most analysts and loan officers
viewed a company more favorably if it did not capitalize leases than an otherwise identical company
that did capitalize leases. One explanation for this finding is that if a company does not capitalize
leases lenders and analysts will be less likely to include such leases in the company's debt to equity
ratios. Similarly, in a pension accounting context, Harper, Mister and Strawser (1987) found that
both sophisticated (bankers) and unsophisticated (accounting students) users of financial statements
were more likely to include a pension liability in the numerator of a debt to equity ratio when the
pension liability was recognized in the balance sheet rather than disclosed in a footnote to the
financial statements.
, Nevertheless, interviews conducted with loan officers in America, Singapore and Australia,
and bank training literature, suggest that loan officers are aware of the effect of non-capitalized
leases on debt to equity ratios and make adjustments to financial statements and cash flow
projections accordingly when assessing loan risk and repayment ability (Wilkins & Zimmer, 1983).
Moreover, the results of an experimental study with loan officers by Wilkins and Zimmer indicate
that there was no association between alternative accounting treatments for financial leases
(capitalization, footnote only) and credit decisions (ability to repay, maximum loan amount).
Evidence from verbal protocols collected in this study suggest that while a minority ofloan officers
in the footnote condition performed written adjustments in their debt to equity ratios to capitalize
lease commitments, all of them appeared to cognitively adjust financial statements to reflect lease
commitments as liabilities.
Recently, Hirst et al. (2002) suggest that differences in fair value performance measurement
and reporting format affect analysts' assessment of risk and value. Specifically, bank analysts'
valuation judgments of high and low risk banks differed under full fair value accounting, where
gains and losses were reported in a performance statement, but analysts did not distinguish between
high and low risk banks when fair value gains and losses were reported in footnotes. Therefore,
footnote disclosure did not appear to be a perfect substitute of financial statement recognition. Hirst
et al. theorize that information provided directly in financial statements, rather than footnotes, is
easier to link to the performance attribute being evaluated and thus is weighted more heavily.
Our paper extends these prior studies by using an experiment involving reporting of financial
instruments at market value to further examine this phenomenon. Our paper not only examines in
a new context whether analysts' reactions differ between footnote-only disclosure and inclusion in
income, but also sheds light on whether any method short of specific line item display on the face
of the income statement will actually achieve the objective of clearer and more useful information
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data on analysts' information processing (Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Bedard & Biggs, 1991). For
example, previous research such as Bernard and Schipper (1994) and Hirst and Hopkins (1998) has
theorized that as a result of the information presentation format fmancials statement users: 1) may
not acquire information or 2) may view that information differently. In this study, verbal protocols
will be used to evaluate whether analysts: 1) do not acquire information disclosed in a footnote, or
2) acquire it but evaluate that information differently than when it is highlighted in financial
statements.
Moreover, previous research has not examined fmancial statement recognition versus
footnote disclosure of information on derivatives. Given the current controversy about the use of
derivatives in the fmancial press (e.g., MacDonald, 1997), financial statement users may view
derivatives differently than other types of financial instruments. For example, recent research by
Koonce et}ll. (2001) indicates that investors consider derivatives riskier than non -derivatives, even
when the underlying economic exposure is held constant. Since derivatives have the potential to be
highly risky investments that may lead to large losses for a company, analysts may view information
on derivatives as important regardless of where is it divulged. In the current study, an experimental
setting is used to focus on whether individual line item disclosure versus footnote disclosure of
derivatives information affects financial analysts' use and evaluation of that information. Based on
the aforementioned research in psychology and accounting which suggests that format may affect
how information is used several hypotheses emerge:
HI: Financial analysts' PIE ratios will be more likely to include unrealized losses or gains on derivatives when
such information is disclosed as a separate line item in the income statement rather than solely infootnotes.
H2: Financial analysts will be more likely to list losses or gains on derivatives as afactor that affected their
investment recommendation when such information is disclosed as a separate line item in the income
statement rather than solely infootnotes.
Research in psychology has suggested that individuals have a tendency to weigh losses more
heavily than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, based on the results of fourteen
experiments, Gneezy and Potters (1997) conclude that individuals are more sensitive to losses than
gains, and become more risk averse the more frequently returns are evaluated. Research in
economics involving theoretical simulations suggests that investors weigh losses about twice as
heavily as gains when they evaluate their portfolios (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). In accounting
research, Rapaccioli and Schiff (1991) found evidence that managers are more likely to report gains
on sales of business segments "above the line" in income from continuing operations, and losses on
business segments "below the line" in income from discontinued.operations, In addition, Revsine
(1991) suggests that managers prefer "loose" financial reporting standards that allow them to defer
recognition of investment gains in order to offset current operating losses. Therefore, financial
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found that investors place more weight on loss probabilities and outcomes than they do on gain
probabilities and outcomes. Similarly, analysts may weigh unrealized losses on derivatives more
heavily than unrealized gains on derivatives. However, there has been relatively little research
devoted to the issue of analysts' evaluation of unrealized gains versus unrealized losses, particularly
with regard to derivatives. It is possible that analysts may view any information on derivative
holdings negatively, even ifthere is an unrealized gain. This study will use the verbal protocol data
to evaluate if analysts view unrealized gains and losses on derivatives favorably, unfavorably, or
neutrally. Two hypotheses follow:
H,i: Financial analysts will be more likely to list unrealized losses on derivatives as afactor that affected their
investment recommendation than unrealized gains, regardless of presentation format.
H3: Financial analysts' PIE ratios will be more likely to include unrealized losses on derivatives than unrealized
gains on derivatives, regardless of presentation format.
METHODS
An experiment was used to investigate the effect of financial statement versus footnote
disclosure of unrealized derivatives gains/losses on financial analysts' use of information about
derivatives. Participants were 81 buy-side equity analysts, portfolio managers, and business
managers. On average, participants had 9.88 years of financial statement analysis experience
(standard deviation 10.79 years). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental
conditions (income statement/loss, footnote/loss, income statement/gain, footnote/gain) described
below. The Appendix contains the complete income statement/loss and income statement/gain
conditions, along with the pertinent changes contained in the footnote/loss and footnote/gain
conditions.
The experimental materials for this study were developed with the assistance of a certified
financial analyst. The materials consisted of three years of summary income statement and balance
sheet information for a hypothetical company, footnotes to the financial statements, a PIE ratio
calculation, an investment recommendation task, and a post-experimental questionnaire. Earnings
projections for the company and its stock price were also included in the case materials. Finally, the
price-earnings ratio for the industry was provided in the materials to give .participants a basis of
comparison when making their investment recommendation. The company-specific information in
the case was based on an actual company. None of the participants recognized the identity of the
company. Financial statement data was held constant across ~onditions, except for the gain or loss
on derivatives. The company was subject to interest rate risk, which is one ofthe most common risks
faced by companies that hold derivatives (Roulstone, 1999).
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Since the data gathering began before issuance of SFAS 133 and the dates of the comparative
financial statements are 1993-1995, the disclosures do not attempt to simulate exactly the disclosures
required under that statement. However, they do reflect directly on the requirements of SFAS 133.
In practice we can expect many, if not most, companies to include the unrealized gains and losses
in an unspecified "other" category (Roulstone, 1999). The effect of this would be very similar to our
"footnote only" condition, since analysts would need to refer to a footnote to separate the derivative
results from other non-operating items. In fact, since only net derivative gains and losses must be
disclosed under SFAS 133, our "footnote only" condition still gives more specific information than
would be required for a company with more than one derivative instrument on its balance sheet.
Although SFAS 133 does not require it explicitly, truly material net gains or losses from non-hedge
derivatives might be reported in a separate line item on the income statement in much the same way
as our "separate line item" condition.
, After reviewing the fmancial statements and footnotes, participants were asked to calculate,.
price-earnings (PIE) ratios for the company for the last three years, compare the company's PIE ratio
for the most recent year with the industry average, make an investment recommendation (buy, hold,
sell), and list factors in order of importance that affected their recommendation. Finally, we gathered
demographic information from participants with a post-experimental questionnaire.
The first independent variable was the financial reporting format of the derivative
information (FORMAT). This variable was assigned a value of 1 if the unrealized derivative
lossl gain was disclosed as a separate line item in the income statement, and 0 if it was disclosed only
in a footnote. The second independent variable was whether there was a gain or a loss on the value
of derivative investments (CHANGE). This variable was assigned a value of 1 if there was a loss
on derivatives, and 0 if there was a gain.
The first dependent variable, PEWD, was assigned a value of 1 if the derivative loss or gain
was included in the analyst's PIE ratio, and 0 if the derivative losslgain was not included in the
analyst's PIE ratio. The second dependent variable, FACTOR, was assigned a value of 1 if the
derivative gain or loss was included in analysts' list of factors that affected their investment
recommendation, and 0 if the derivative was not on the list.
Concurrent verbal protocols are generally considered to be the most appropriate method to
obtain evidence of what subjects are thinking about as they perform a task (Ericsson & Simon, 1984;
Bedard & Biggs, 1991). Verbal protocols were collected from a subset of 17 participants at their
place of business to further examine the way they processed the information about derivatives. These
participants were evenly divided among the four experimental conditions and asked to "think aloud"
as they performed the task. A researcher was present to operate a tape recorder and remind the
participants to think aloud.
Verbal protocols were coded using the following procedures. First, audio tapes of
verbalizations were transcribed into phrases. Next, one author and a graduate student with public
accounting experience independently coded the transcribed verbal protocols. Differences in coding
Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, Volume 8, Number 1,2004
11
were reconciled between the coders. The protocols were first examined to identify all statements
pertaining to derivatives in order to assess if analysts acquired the derivatives information. Then,
to further examine analysts' information processing about derivatives, statements about derivatives
were coded by type: factual, evaluations, inferences or queries. Statements coded as factual simply
expressed that the company had derivatives (i.e., "the company engaged in some interest rate
swaps"). Statements coded as evaluations expressed an opinion about the derivatives (i.e., "the only
thing that concerns me is the unrealized loss on derivatives"). Evaluations were further coded as
unfavorable (see above), or not important ("unrealized gains on derivative transactions, who
cares?"). Favorable evaluations regarding derivatives were searched for but not found. Statements
coded as inferences involved a supposition about the derivatives (i.e., "I guess it must be the gain
is due to derivative transactions"). Finally, statements coded as queries expressed a desire for more
information about the derivatives (i.e., "I would call the company and find out why their unrealized
loss,... happened and would it happen again").,,
RESULTS
The first hypothesis asks if financial analysts' PIE ratios will be more likely to include losses
or gains on derivatives when such information is disclosed in the income statement rather than in
the footnotes. As shown in Panel A of Table 1, approximately 71 percent of analysts in the income
statement disclosure condition included the derivative gain/loss in their PIE ratios, as opposed to 5
percent of the analysts in the footnote disclosure condition (Chi square = 37.0; P = 0.001). Multiple
regression analysis was used to determine if these results are significantly different from chance
(Panel B of Table 1). FORMAT is statistically significant (t = 8.10; P = 0.00001), indicating that
analysts in the income statement condition included the derivative losslgain in their PIE ratios
significantly more often than analysts in the footnote condition.
The second hypothesis asks if financial analysts will be more likely to list losses or gains on
derivatives as a factor that affected their investment recommendation when such information is
disclosed in the income statement rather than in footnotes. As shown in Panel A of Table 2,
approximately 29 percent of analysts in the income statement disclosure condition included the
derivative gain/loss in their list of factors that affected their investment recommendation, as opposed
to 10 percent of the analysts in the footnote disclosure condition (Chi square = 4.74; p = 0.02). As
shown on Panel B of Table 2, FORMAT is significant (t= 1.94; p = 0.028), indicating that analysts'
in the income statement condition included the derivative losslgain in their list of investment
recommendation factors more often than analysts' in the footnote condition.
The third hypothesis asks if financial analysts' PIE ratios will be more likely to include
losses on derivatives than gains on derivatives. As shown jn Panel A of Table 1, 51 percent of
financial analysts included unrealized derivative losses in their PIE ratios, as compared to 25 percent
of financial analysts who included unrealized derivative gains in their PIE ratios (chi square = 5.89;
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p = 0.01). It is interesting to note that none of the analysts in the footnote/gain condition brought the
unrealized gain into their PIE calculation, while 44 percent of those in the income statement/gain
condition took out the unrealized gain before calculating their PIEs. As reported in Panel B of Table
1, CHANGE is significant (t = 2.23; P = 0.014), indicating that analysts included derivative losses
in their PIE ratios significantly more often than derivative gains.
Table 1: Analysis of Financial Analysts' PIE Ratios
Panel A: Percentage of Analysts Who Included
Derivative Gain/Loss in Their PIE Ratios
Format Loss Gain Total
Income Statement 0.83 0.56 0.71
n=23 n= 18 n=41
" Footnote 0.11 0.00 0.05r
n= 18 n= 22 n=40
Total 0.51 0.25 0.38
n= 41 n=40 n = 81
Panel B: Multiple Regression Analysis of Analysts' PIE ratios
Model: pewd = f(Format, Change)
F-Statistic = 38.2P-Value = O.OOOOIAdjustedR-Square = 0.49
Variable Beta T-Statistic P-Value
Format 0.65 8.10 0.00001
Change 0.18 2.23 0.014
Key:
Pewd = 1 if derivative loss/gain included in PIE ratio, 0 if derivative loss/gain not included in PIE ratio
Format = 1 if derivative loss/gain reported in the income statement, 0 if derivative loss/gain in footnote
Change = 1 if derivative loss, 0 if derivative gain
The fourth hypothesis asks if financial analysts will be more likely to list losses on
derivatives as a factor that affected their investment recommendation than gains. As shown in Panel
A of Table 2, approximately 29 percent of analysts in the loss condition included the derivative in
their list of factors that affected their investment recommendation, as opposed to 10 percent of the
analysts in the gain condition (chi square = 4.74; P = 0.02). Interestingly, analysts appeared equally
likely to include the derivative information in their list based on FORMAT (whether or not it was
shown in the income statement or a footnote) and CHANGE (whether it was a gain or a loss). As
reported in Panel B of Table 2, CHANGE is significant (t = 1.94; P = 0.028), indicating that analysts
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in the loss condition included the derivative in their list of investment recommendation factors
significantly more often than analysts' in the gain condition.
Table 2: Analysis of Financial Analysts' Investment Recommendation Factors
Panel A: Percentage of Analysts Who Included
Derivative Gain/Loss in Investment Recommendation Factors
Format Loss Gain Total
Income Statement 0.39 0.17 0.29
n=23 n= 18 n= 41
Footnote 0.17 0.05 0.10
n = 18 n=22 n=40
Total 0.29 0.10 0.20
,
n =41 n=40 n= 81~
s
Panel B: Multiple Regression Analysis of Analysts' Investment Recommendation Factors
Model: FACTOR = f (FORMAT, CHANGE)
F-Statistic = 4.31P-Value = O.OIAdjusted R-Square = 0.079
Variable Beta T-Statistic P-Value
FORMAT 0.17 1.94 0.028
CHANGE 0.17 1.94 0.028
Key:
FACTOR = I if derivative loss/gain included analysts' list of factors that affected their investment
recommendation, 0 if derivative loss/gain not included in the list
FORMAT = 1 if derivative loss/gain reported in the income statement, 0 if derivative loss/gain in footnote
CHANGE = 1 if derivative loss, 0 if derivative gain
The verbal protocols of 17 participants were analyzed to further investigate if reporting
losses or gains on derivatives in the income statement, as opposed to a footnote, affect financial
analysts' use of derivatives information. First, to examine the effect of format on analysts'
information acquisition, the number of participants who did not mention the derivative at all was
examined. Three out of eight analysts in the footnote conditions did not acquire the derivative
information, as opposed to one out of nine analysts in the income statement conditions. Therefore,
the majority (three out of four) of participants who made no mention of the derivative were in the
footnote conditions. While almost half of the participants in the footnote conditions missed the
derivative, only one analyst in the income statement conditions did not notice the derivative.
Interestingly, all of the analysts in the income statement/loss condition acquired the derivatives
information, whereas at least one member of each of the other groups failed to consider that
information. Although these numbers are small, participants appeared more likely to notice the
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information on derivatives when it was shown as a separate line item in the financial statements,
providing further and more direct evidence that disclosing information on derivatives in footnotes
may fail to make that information readily available and clear to financial statement users.
Second, to gain further insight into analysts' reactions to the derivative information,
statements about derivatives were coded as facts, evaluations, queries or inferences. The results are
shown in Table 3. The average number of statements coded as facts, evaluations, inferences and
queries are displayed on Panel A of the table by condition (IS/Gain, IS/Loss, Footnote/Gain,
Footnote/Loss). Surprisingly, Panel B shows that negative evaluations of derivatives were made
more often in the footnote conditions as opposed to the financial statement conditions (mean 0.25
vs. 0.11), suggesting that analysts may have been more suspicious of management intentions when
derivative information was disclosed in a footnote. In contrast, the income statement/gain condition
.s
'was the only condition where there were no negative evaluations of the derivatives, perhaps because
the information was clearly disclosed and gains were viewed more positively than losses.
As shown on Panel C, for statements coded as facts, it appears that participants in the loss
conditions mentioned the derivatives about twice as often as participants in the gain conditions (1.11
vs. 0.5 statements on average). Consistent with the idea that losses are weighed more heavily than
gains, the derivatives were deemed unimportant more often in the gain conditions as opposed to the
loss conditions (0.5 vs. 0.11 on average). However, no favorable evaluations of derivatives were
found in any of the conditions, suggesting that even when there was an unrealized gain on
derivatives, analysts' reactions were neutral at best. This finding suggests analysts may view
unrealized gains on derivatives as more inherently risky than unrealized gains on other types of
financial instruments. Results were similar across conditions with regard to inferences. Participants
in the income statement/loss condition made the most queries on average (1.4), almost twice as
many as any other group (0.25, 0.5,0.75 respectively), providing further evidence to suggest that
participants may have been more concerned about losses on derivatives than gains, particularly when
such losses were clearly displayed on the income statement.
Third, another analysis of the protocols was conducted excluding those subjects who failed
to acquire the derivatives information. Since the majority of analysts who did not consider the
derivatives information were in the footnote conditions, the previous results may have been
overstated for the income statement conditions, and understated for the footnote conditions. The
results of this analysis are shown in Table 4. Similar to the previous results, Panel B shows that
negative evaluations of derivatives were made more often in the footnote conditions as opposed to
the financial statement conditions (mean 0.4 vs. 0.125), and Panel C shows that the derivatives were
deemed unimportant more often in the gain conditions as opposed to the loss conditions (0.67 vs.
0.14 on average). Also, Panel C shows for statements coded as facts, it appears that participants in
the loss conditions mentioned the derivatives about twice as often as participants in the gain
conditions (1.42 vs. 0.67 statements on average).
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Table 3: Results of Verbal Protocol Analysis
Panel A: Average Number of Statements by Condition
Statement Types'
Condition" Fact Eval-UF Eval-NI Inference Query Total
ISlLoss n = 5 1.00 0.20 0.20 0.60 1.40 3.40
FootILoss n = 4 1.25 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.25 2.25
IS/Gain n = 4 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 2.25
Foot/Gain n = 4 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.75 2.75
Overall n = 17 0.82 0.18 0.29 0.59 0.76 2.71
Panel B: Income Statement vs. Footnote
Statement Types'
Condition" Fact Eval-UF Eval-NI Inference Query Total
IS n = 9 0.78 0.11 0.33 0.56 1.00 2.88
"
Footnote n = 8 0.88 0.25 0.25 0.63 0.50 2.50
Panel C: Loss vs. Gain
Statement Types'
Condition" Fact Eval-UF Eval-NI Inference Query Total
Loss n= 9 1.11 0.22 0.11 0.56 0.89 2.89
Gain n = 8 0.50 0.125 0.50 0.63 0.63 2.50
Key:
a Statement Types:
Fact = factual statement about derivatives (i.e., "the company engaged in some interest rate swaps").
Eval-Uf = unfavorable evaluation of the derivatives (i.e., "the only thing that concerns me is the
unrealized loss on derivatives").
Eval-Nl = derivative evaluated as unimportant (i.e., "unrealized gains on derivative transactions, who
cares?").
Inference = a supposition about the derivatives (i.e., "I guess it must be the gain is due to derivative
transactions").
Query = expressed a desire for more information about the derivatives (i.e., "I would call the company
and find out why their unrealized loss ... happened and would it happen again")
b Conditions:
ISlLoss = Loss on derivatives shown as a line item on Income Statement
IS/Gain = Gain on derivatives shown as a line item on Income Statement
FootILoss = Loss on derivatives disclosed in a footnote
Foot/Gain = Gain on derivatives disclosed in a footnote
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Table 4: Results of Verbal Protocol Analysis: Excluding Analysts
Who Did Not Acquire the Derivatives Information
Panel A: Average Number of Statements by Condition
Statement Types'
Condition" Fact Eval-UF Eval-NI Inference Query Total
ISlLoss n = 5 1.00 0.20 0.20 0.60 1.40 3.40
FootILoss n = 2 2.5 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 4.50
IS/Gain n = 3 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 3.00
Foot/Gain n = 3 0.67 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.00 3.67
,
Overall n = 13 1.08 0.23 0.38 0.77 1.00 3.53
Panel B: Income Statement vs. Footnote
Statement Types'
Condition" Fact Eval-UF Eval-NI Inference Query Total
ISn= 8 0.875 0.125 0.375 0.625 1.125 3.25
Footnote n = 5 1.4 0.40 0.40 1.00 0.80 4.00
Panel C: Loss vs. Gain
Statement Types'
Condition" Fact Eval-UF Eval-NI Inference Query Total
Loss n= 7 1.43 0.29 0.14 0.71 . I.l4 3.71
Gain n = 6 0.67 0.17 0.67 0.83 0.83 3.33
Key:
a Statement Types:
Fact = factual statement about derivatives (i.e., "the company engaged in some interest rate swaps").
Eval-UF = unfavorable evaluation of the derivatives (i.e., "the only thing that concerns me is the
unrealized loss on derivatives").
Eval-NI = derivative evaluated as unimportant (i.e., "unrealized gains on derivative transactions, who
cares?").
Inference = a supposition about the derivatives (i.e., "I guess it must be the gain is due to derivative
transactions").
Query = expressed a desire for more information about the derivatives (i.e., "I would call the company
and find out why their unrealized loss ... happened and would it happen again")
b Conditions:
ISlLoss = Loss on derivatives shown as a line item on Income Statement
IS/Gain = Gain on derivatives shown as a line item on Income Statement
FootILoss = Loss on derivatives disclosed in a footnote
Foot/Gain = Gain on derivatives disclosed in a footnote
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However, Panel A shows that factual statements about the derivatives were mentioned most
often in the footnotelloss condition (mean 2.5) and this condition also had the highest number of
statements about derivatives overall (mean 4.5). In addition, Panel B shows that analysts in the
footnote conditions made more factual statements (mean 4.00 vs. 3.25), unfavorable evaluations
(mean 0.4 vs. 0.125), inferences (mean 1.00 vs. 0.625), and comments about the derivatives overall
(mean 4.00 vs. 3.25) than analysts in the income statement conditions. Therefore, it appears that if
analysts in the footnote conditions acquired the derivatives information, they were likely to give it
as much as, if not more consideration than analysts in the income statement conditions, and may
have judged it more harshly. These findings shed light on the results of previous research (e.g.,
Bernard and Schipper 1994), which has raised questions about whether financial statement users fail
to acquire information in footnotes, or evaluate it differently than information in financial
statements. The results of the verbal protocols suggest that, after excluding those analysts who did
not acquire the derivatives information, the remaining analysts may have actually given greater
consideration to the derivatives information, and evaluated it more negatively, when it was disclosed
j
in a footnote rather than the income statement.
CONCLUSIONS
This study investigates whether disclosure of an unrealized gain or loss on derivatives as a
separate line item in the income statement, as opposed to in a footnote, affects financial analysts'
information processing. Specifically, the study examines if the information presentation format of
the unrealized derivative gain or loss influences whether the gain or loss will be included in analysts'
PIE ratios. The results of this study indicate that when the derivative gain/loss was included as a
separate line item in the income statement, analysts included the gain/loss significantly more often
in their PIE ratios, and were more likely to list the derivative as a factor affecting their investment
recommendation, than when the derivative gain/loss was disclosed only in a footnote. The findings
of this study also indicate that analysts included losses on derivatives in their PIE ratios significantly
more often than gains, and were more likely to list the derivative as a factor affecting their
investment recommendation when there was a loss as opposed to a gain.
Previous research has speculated that financial statement users may: a) fail to acquire
information in footnotes, or b) place less weight on information if it was disclosed in the footnotes
as opposed to the financial statements. The results of verbal protocol analysis from this study
provide evidence that participants appeared less likely to consider information regarding derivatives
when it was contained in the footnotes. However, after excluding those analysts who did not acquire
the derivatives information, the remaining analysts may have actually given greater consideration
to the derivatives information, and evaluated it more negatively, when it was disclosed in a footnote.
Therefore, these results suggest that previous research findings may have been driven more by
financial statement users failing to acquire information in footnotes, rather than placing less weight
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on that information. Although the verbal protocol results were based on a small sample size, they
echo the findings of the larger sample regression results, and provide additional and more direct
evidence that analysts may be more likely to consider disclosures on derivatives when they are
displayed in the financial statements rather than the footnotes.
Currently, both the FASB and IASC are working toward reporting fair-value recognition of
all financial instruments in the financial statements (FASB, 2001; JWG, 2000). This study responds
to calls for more research on disclosure and the potential effects of changes in accounting rules
(Johnson, 1992; Beresford & Johnson, 1995; Hussein & Rosman, 1997). The results of this study
have implications for accounting standard setters, accounting educators, auditors, and users and
preparers of financial statements. The findings of this study suggest that fmancial analysts will be
more likely to include changes in the value of derivatives in their PIE ratios when this information
isrreported as a separate line item in the income statement as opposed to in a footnote. Moreover,
analysts' investment recommendations may be more likely to be influenced by changes in value of
derivatives when such information is included as a separate line item in the financial statements,
particularly when there is a loss. However, this study also shows that many analysts, when provided
with sufficient, clearly presented information, will choose to exclude unrealized derivative gains
from their PIE ratios. This suggests that when financial instruments are reported at fair value with
unrealized gains and losses reported in income, net reporting of gains and losses, along with
reporting ofthose gains and losses in other than separate line item format, may frustrate the intent
of providing statement readers with more useful information.
It is also important to examine the relevance of disclosure-type research in the context of the
efficient markets hypothesis. As Kothari (2001, 110) points out: "Choice between disclosure in
footnotes and recognition in financial statements ... is less contentious from the perspective of its
effect on security prices in an efficient market. Naturally, the opposite would be true ... if markets
were not efficient." Therefore, if capital markets are in fact efficient in a semi-strong form sense,
our results have far less salience. However a consensus appears to be emerging in the financial
economics and accounting literature that capital markets are far less efficient than previously
thought. Kothari (2001, 109) observes: "The belief that 'price convergence to value is a much slower
process than prior evidence suggests' (Frankel & Lee, 1998,315) has acquired currency among
leading academics, spurring research on fundamental analysis". If fundamental analysis (including
ratio analysis) does have a role to play in price discovery, then our results suggest that the outcome
ofthe fundamental analysis depends on the disclosure format. We believe that experimental studies
(such as ours) complement capital markets research directions suggested by Kothari (2001), Lee
(200 I) and others.
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Experimental Instrument (Format slightly modified to match publication specifications.)
(Note: bold and italics added to highlight line item on derivative transactions to assist reader; no such highlighting was done in
the experimental version)
Case A: Losses on Derivatives accrued in Financial Statements.
ACME/Ne.
The following summaries set forth selected financial data for the Company for each of the three years in the period ended December
31, 1995. Selected financial data should be read in conjunction with selected notes to accounts and other industry data provided.
Statement of Operations Data (Dollars and shares in thousands except per share amounts)






Total revenues and gains
Expenses and Losses
Cost of products sold
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses
Interest expense
Unrealized loss on derivative transactions/settlement, net






































s 0.39 s 0.36
16,104 16,039
Selected Financial Data (Dollars and shares in thousands except per share amounts)
December 31
1995 1993
Plant and equipment, net
Total assets
Long-term debt


































Growth Projections: Acme company's operating earnings are expected to grow at the industry average for the foreseeable future.
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Selected Notes to Financial Data
Years Ended December 31, 1995, 1994, 1993
Cash and equivalents: Cash and equivalents are stated at cost. Cash equivalents include time deposits, money market instruments
and short-term debt obligations with original maturities of three months or less. The carrying amount approximates fair value because
of the short maturity of these instruments.
Inventories: Inventories are stated at the lower of cost (first-in, first-out) or market.
Plant and equipment: Plant and equipment are stated at cost. Plant and equipment, except for leasehold improvements, are
depreciated over their related estimated useful lives, using the straight-line method. Leasehold improvements are amortized over the
terms of the respective leases, using the straight-line method. Expenditures for maintenance and repairs are charged to operations
currently; renewals and betterments are capitalized.
Other assets: Other assets include deferred and prepaid costs, goodwill and other intangibles. Deferred and prepaid costs represent
costs incurred relating to long-term customer sales agreements. Deferred and prepaid costs are amortized ratably over the terms of
agreements, generally three to six years. Goodwill and other intangibles are amortized over periods ranging from three to twenty
years, using the straight-line method.
Interest rate swap agreements: The Company periodically enters into interest rate swap or derivative transactions with the intent
to manage the interest rate sensitivity of portions of its debt. The difference between the amount of interest paid and the amount of
interest received under interest rate swap agreements due to changing interest rates is charged or credited to interest expense over
the life of the agreements. All interest rate swaps are marked-to-market, i.e. the unrealized gains/losses on outstanding agreements
are recognized in the income statement and stockholders equity. At December 31, 1995, the Company had four outstanding rate
swap/derivative positions with a total notional amount of $ 96 million. The fair value of interest rate swaps (used for risk
management purposes) is the estimated amount that the company would receive or pay to terminate the swap agreements at the
reporting date.
Case B: Losses on Derivatives disclosed in a footnote (selected information).
~: some of the information held constant between conditions is omitted).















$ 0.50 $ 2.61








Cost of products sold
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses
Interest expense
Income (loss) before income taxes
Income taxes
Net Income (loss)
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Selected Notes to Financial Data
Years Ended December31, 1995,1994, 1993
(Note: Bold and italics added to show differences between Case A notes and Case B notes)
Interest rate swap agreements: The Company periodically enters into interest rate swap or derivative transactions with the intent
to manage the interest rate sensitivity of portions of its debt. The difference between the amount of interest paid and the amount of
interest received under interest rate swap agreements due to changing interest rates is charged or credited to interest expense over
the life of the agreements. At December 31, 1995, the Company had four outstanding rate swap/derivative positions with a total
notional amount of $ 96 million. The fair value of interest rate swaps (used for risk management purposes) is the estimated amount
that the company would receive or pay to terminate the swap agreements at the reporting date. Based on the estimated cost of
terminating these positions, the Company has an unrealized net loss at December 31,1995 olS 5.689 million.
Case C: Gains on Derivatives accrued in Financial Statements.
Q::!ote:bold and italics added to highlight line item on derivative transactions.)
ACME/NC.
The following summaries set forth selected financial data for the Company for each of the three years in the period ended December
31, 1~95. Selected financial data should be read in conjunction with selected notes to accounts and other industry data provided.
~
Statement of Operations Data (Dollars and shares in thousands except per share amounts)






Unrealized gain on derivative transactions/settlement.net
Total revenues and gains
Expenses and Losses
Cost of products sold
Selling,distribution and administrative expenses
Interest expense
Income (loss) before income taxes
Income taxes
Net Income (loss)
Net Income (loss) per share
Dividends per share
Average common shares
Selected Financial Data (Dollars and shares in thousands except per share amounts)
Plant and equipment, net $ 116,900
Total assets 581,541
Long-term debt 74,365




Market Price per share 27.00
























































Growth Projections: Acme company's operating earnings are expected to grow at the industry average for the foreseeable future.
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Selected Notes to Financial Data
Years Ended December31, 1995, 1994, 1993
Cash and equivalents: Cash and equivalents are stated at cost. Cash equivalents include time deposits, money market instruments
and short-term debt obligations with original maturities of three months or less. The carrying amount approximates fair value because
of the short maturity of these instruments.
Inventories: Inventories are stated at the lower of cost (first-in, first-out) or market.
Plant and equipment: Plant and equipment are stated at cost. Plant and equipment, except for leasehold improvements, are
depreciated over their related estimated useful lives, using the straight-line method. Leasehold improvements are amortized over the
terms of the respective leases, using the straight-line method. Expenditures for maintenance and repairs are charged to operations
currently; renewals and betterments are capitalized.
Other assets: Other assets include deferred and prepaid costs, goodwill and other intangibles. Deferred and prepaid costs represent
costs incurred relating to long-term customer sales agreements. Deferred and prepaid costs are amortized ratably over the terms of
agreements, generally three to six years. Goodwill and other intangibles are amortized over periods ranging from three to twenty
years, using the straight-line method.
Interest rate swap agreements: The Company periodically enters into interest rate swap or derivative transactions with the intent
to manage the interest rate sensitivity of portions of its debt. The difference between the amount of interest paid and the amount of
interest received under interest rate swap agreements due to changing interest rates is charged or credited to interest expense over
the life of the agreements. All interest rate swaps are marked-to-market, i.e. the unrealized gainsllosses on outstanding agreements
are recognized in the income statement and stockholders equity. At December 31, 1995, the Company had four outstanding rate
swap/derivative positions with a total notional amount of$ 96million. The fair value of interest rate swap (used for risk management
purposes) is the estimated amount that the company would receive or pay to terminate the swap agreements at the reporting date.
Case D: Gains in Derivatives disclosed in a footnote (selected information).
~: some of the information held constant between conditions is omitted).
Statement of Operations Data (Dollars and shares in thousands except per share amounts)







Cost of products sold
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses
Interest expense
Income (loss) before income taxes
Income taxes
Net Income (loss)






























$1.30 $ 0.50 $ 2.61
$ 0.40 $ 0.39 $0.36
16103 16104 16039
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Selected Notes to Financial Data
Years Ended December 31, 1995, 1994, 1993
(Note: Bold and italics added to show differences between Case C notes and Case D notes)
Interest rate swap agreements: The Company periodically enters into interest rate swap or derivative transactions with the intent
to manage the interest rate sensitivity of portions of its debt. The difference between the amount of interest paid and the amount of
interest received under interest rate swap agreements due to changing interest rates is charged or credited to interest expense over
the life of the agreements. At December 3 I, 1995, the Company had four outstanding rate swap/derivative positions with a total
notional amount of $ 96 million. The fair value of interest rate swap (used for risk management purposes) is the estimated amount
that the company would receive or pay to terminate the swap agreements at the reporting date. Based on the estimated cost of
terminating these positions, the Company has an unrealized net gain at December 31, 1995 of $ 5.689 million.
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of the Allied Academies, Inc., a non profit association of scholars whose purpose is to encourage
and support the advancement and exchange of knowledge, understanding and teaching throughout
the world. The AAFSJ is a principal vehicle for achieving the objectives ofthe organization. The
editorial mission ofthis journal is to publish empirical and theoretical manuscripts which advance
the disciplines of accounting and fmance.
Dr. Janet Dye, University of Alaska Southeast, is the Accountancy Editor and Dr. Denise
Woodbury, Weber State University, is the Finance Editor. Theirjoint mission has been to make the
AAFSJ better known and more widely read.
As has been the case with the previous issues of the AAFSJ, the articles contained in this
volume have been double blind refereed. The acceptance rate for manuscripts in this issue, 25%,
con'forms to our editorial policies.
The Editors work to foster a supportive, mentoring effort on the part of the referees which
will result in encouraging and supporting writers. They will continue to welcome different
viewpoints because in differences we find learning; in differences we develop understanding; in
differences we gain knowledge and in differences we develop the discipline into a more
comprehensive, less esoteric, and dynamic metier.
Information about the Allied Academies, the AAFSJ, and the other journals published by the
Academy, as well as calls for conferences, are published on our web site. In addition, we keep the
web site updated with the latest activities of the organization. Please visit our site and know that we
welcome hearing from you at any time.
Janet Dye, University of Alaska Southeast
Denise Woodbury, Weber State University
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